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Preface
The present publication results from the research project “Development and
validation of scientific indicators of the relationship between criminality, social
cohesion and economic performance” which has been commissioned and financed
by the European Commission, Directorate-General Employment and Social Affairs.
The results obtained within the framework of the project do not necessarily represent
the opinion of the European Commission nor can the Commission be held
responsible for the contents of the study. The aim of launching the research project
was to contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between criminality,
economic performance, social cohesion and the socio-economic situation of the
population. We have tried to achieve this aim by employing adequate multivariate
statistical methods to European data from different levels of regional disaggregation.
When interpreting our empirical results, it has to be taken into account that the
estimated coefficients of some variables might be affected by the use our regional
data set. Since the Commission was primarily interested in the use of replicable
official data, no individual survey data have been collected. Thus, some results might
suffer from unobservable heterogeneity or the omission of relevant (but unavailable)
variables. In the project report as well as in the present paper, we have made all
potential results of this nature quite clear by hinting at these problems (see, for
instance, the interpretation of crimes committed by “foreigners”). In spite of the fact
that empirical investigations are performed with great care, it seems advisable to make
this note of caution, because otherwise superficial reading might lead to potential
misinterpretations. Moreover, it might be important to note that channels of influence
are crime-specific. This implies that for types of crime which are not subject of our
study, as, for instance, white-collar and organised crime, no conclusions can be
drawn.
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and Nikolaos Tassiopoulos for the supply of regional crime data from their
respective countries. Without their kind co-operation an adequate realisation of the
project would not have been achieved. Of course, the same applies to our
correspondents in the 16 German State Criminal Police Offices. We are also grateful
to Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Joanna Shapland, Dieter Dölling, Erling Eide, Thomas Feltes,
Jeffrey Grogger, Henner Hess, Susanne Karstedt, Hans-Jürgen Kerner. Steven Levitt,
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J. Sampson and Michael Willis for their valuable hints and help concerning the
literature relevant for our project, though we were not able to include all of their
comments. We are also grateful to Martina Lauk, Kerstin Neumann, Eva Sandner,
Ulla Spengler and Florian Zipfel for research assistance and Gaby Spengler for
proof-reading. Last but not least we want to thank Herbert S. Buscher, Wolfgang
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Non technical summary
According to the European Parliament, unemployment, social disintegration, the lack
of an integrative policy, and the worsening of urban services and living conditions
cause frustration and despair, especially among economically and socially
disadvantaged groups, and constitute unfavourable conditions that might lead to
delinquent behaviour. Furthermore increasing poverty and inequality are supposed to
be crime-enhancing factors. Based on this view, the European Commission has put
out to tender a research project titled “Development and validation of scientific
indicators of the relationship between criminality, social cohesion and economic
performance” which has been executed by ZEW during the period 1/12/1998 –
29/2/2000. The present paper provides an overview of central results obtained from
this project.
The paper intends to contribute to a better understanding of the interactions between
criminality, economic performance and social cohesion. We try to achieve this aim
by evaluating the existing economic and criminological research (with a special focus
on quantitative research) and by carrying out own empirical investigations on the
basis of a panel consisting of national time series from the 15 EU member states, an
international cross-section of nations and an unique set of regional panel data
originating from eight EU member states.
Our empirical results about causes of crime reveal the crime reducing potential of
intact family values. A smaller number of divorces and earlier marriage significantly
reduce delinquency. By the same token, less efficient child care as a consequence of
lacking family cohesion might explain the crime enhancing effects found for
increasing female labour force participation rates. Further evidence supporting the
interdependence of crime and the labour market show up in significant parameter
estimates for indicators of unemployment, fixed-term contracts and part-time
working. Furthermore, we find that higher wealth is associated with higher property
crime rates and more drug-related offences, and that in turn drug offences foster the
incidence of property crime.
Compared to studies assessing causes of crime, investigations on its consequences
are rare. In order to contribute to the closure of this gap, a special focus of our
analysis is to investigate the impact of crime on economic performance. Using highly
disaggregated regional data we find evidence that employment as well as GDP growth
rates are negatively affected by the incidence of criminality. Interestingly, this result
does not show up when the analyses are performed with data from the national level.
Regarding the importance of social cohesion on criminality and the strong evidence
of reversal effects of crime on economics, one may conclude that fighting crime
should not only be a matter of domestic policy, but also of social policy and of
selfish economic interests, i.e. of economic policy.
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11 Introduction
In the view of the European Parliament unemployment, social disintegration, the
lack of an integrative policy and the worsening of urban services and living
conditions cause frustration and despair, especially among economically and
socially disadvantaged groups, and constitute unfavourable conditions causing
delinquent behaviour. Furthermore, increasing poverty and inequality are
supposed to be crime-enhancing factors (European Commission 1998:2).
Based on this estimation, the European Commission has put out to tender a
research project titled “Development and validation of scientific indicators of the
relationship between criminality, social cohesion and economic performance”
which has been executed by ZEW during the period 1/12/1998 – 29/2/2000. The
present paper provides an overview of central results obtained from the project.
The extensive project report (Entorf and Spengler 2000a, hereafter abbreviated as
E&S) is published as ZEW Dokumentation.
As articulated by the European Commission, the object of the project is to
improve the knowledge of the interactions between criminality, economic
performance and social cohesion. We try to achieve this aim by evaluating the
existing “criminometric” research and by carrying out own empirical
investigations on causes and consequences of crime. Much attention has been
paid to the collection of adequate data. We finally succeeded in creating data sets
consisting of a panel of national time series from the 15 EU member states, an
international cross-section of nations and a unique set of regional panel data
originating from eight EU member states.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises recent quantitative
research on socio-economic causes and consequences of crime. Section 3
provides an overview of data and methods we used in our empirical analyses. In
the two following sections panel estimation results from the national (Section 4)
as well as from the regional level (Section 5) are presented. Section 6 provides a
synthesis and interpretation of results. Section 7 reports on our investigations of
the consequences of crime and Section 8 concludes with some policy
implications.
22 Summary of recent empirical crime research
The focus of the existing crime literature is on causes of crime. More than 90 per
cent of all studies under investigation deal with questions concerning this issue.
In contrast, the number of studies investigating the consequences of crime and/or
its interactions with other variables is rather small. This ongoing specialisation
might be due to the fact that there is still no full agreement neither on the
determinants of crime nor on their relative importance. By investigating a large
number of recent papers in leading criminological, sociological and economic
journals and by considering significant monographs and anthologies, we have
tried to identify the most important determinants and consequences of crime.
Since the authors of this Report are economists and have already been engaged
in crime research for several years, the contributions in leading economic journals
(The Journal of Political Economy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The
American Economic Review etc.) can be regarded as fully covered from the
onset of economic crime research in the late sixties. In order to capture the non-
economic contributions adequately it is advisable to investigate criminological
journals, since these bring together the work of crime researchers from all other
fields. The major criminological journals are Criminology, The Journal of
Quantitative Criminology, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, The
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology and British Journal of Criminology,
among which Criminology and The Journal of Quantitative Criminology have a
main focus on quantitative research. These journals have been systematically
searched for relevant papers since 1990. As quantitative crime research is a
domain of sociologists, many of their contributions are also published in
generally oriented sociological journals, among which American Sociological
Review and The American Journal of Sociology are the most important ones.
These journals have been searched since 1985. Apart from the systematic
investigation of the leading criminological and sociological journals, we have also
closely examined other promising sources obtained from an intensive electronic
databank search and by e-mail and postal questioning of national and
international experts in the field of quantitative crime research.
Since today the empirical literature on crime has reached an enormous extent, it is
recommendable that a survey is structured in some way. This can be done, for
example, with regard to the underlying theories. Since we are restricted to non-
individual (official) data according to the empirical tasks of the project, two (out
of eight) theories extensively discussed in E&S seem to be suitable for our
purpose. The first is the social disorganisation theory. Following this theory,
delinquency emerges as a consequence of a distorted complex system of
friendship and kinship networks, damaged roots in family life and malfunctioning
socialisation processes. At the “macro” level (which could be a regional level)
3low economic status, family disruption and urbanisation are important indicators
of crime according to this line of thought.
The economic theory of crime, based on Gary Becker’s (1968) seminal article, is
the second important theory to be mentioned. According to this theory,
individuals form expectations of their legal and illegal income opportunities.
Criminal activities become more likely, when illegal income opportunities are
higher than opportunities from legal work. Expectations of uncertain illegal
income opportunities depend on the potential loot, but also on the probability of
being arrested and convicted, and on the severity of the punishment if convicted.
Extensions of the model (see, in particular, Ehrlich 1973) introduce inequality as
an indicator of crime. Higher inequality would diminish legal income
opportunities and increase incentives to commit crimes because of the presence
of lucrative targets. Following these arguments, empirical indicators of economic
crime theories are “wealth” (often measured by GDP per capita), which might
cover both legal income opportunities and illegal income opportunities (i.e.
potential targets), deterrence (clear-up rates, conviction rates, form and severity
of punishment) and inequality (Gini coefficients, for instance). The
unemployment rate or other variables of underemployment should also be
present in empirical investigations of the economic crime model, because it
measures exclusion from legal work, and, thus, lacking legal income
opportunities.
The complete survey of the literature is summarised in Table 1 (Table 11 in
E&S). The survey focuses on empirical applications and presents a long list of
potential indicators and consequences of crime. The table is organised as
follows: Column 1 contains variables which are of central importance to empirical
crime research. The expected impact of the respective variable on crime based
on theoretical and empirical knowledge is depicted in column 2, where “+” (“-“)
means that a higher value of the variable is expected to increase (decrease) crime.
The same logic applies to column 3, where the feedback effect of higher crime
on the respective variable is considered. Apart from “+” and “-“ , the cells of
columns 2 and 3 may also be empty (an effect does not exist), or they may be
filled with a “?” (no evidence could be derived from the literature). In cases in
which the cells contain a combination of + and -, crime theories provide
ambiguous predictions. In such cases effects which are more likely according to
empirical findings1 come first. Column 4 contains measures which are generally
used as indicators of theoretically motivated variables. When a cell remains
                                                
1 Example: Routine activity theory expects a negative sign of the impact of unemployment on crime.
Economic and other theories expect a positive sign. Looking through empirical results there are
mainly positive effects. Thus, in Table 1 we code the effect of unemployment on crime with (“+/-
“).
4empty, measuring this variable is straightforward (e.g. unemployment). Column 5
gives a general characterisation of the type of variable. Finally, in column 6, we
refer to corresponding discussions in the subsections of E&S. It has to be
stressed that our list of indicators is organised according to the demanded macro
focus of the project.2 Thus, indicators which are explicitly tied to the individual
level are not included in Table 1.
Besides demographic factors like age and gender (a high share of all crimes is
committed by young males, aged 14 to 25), we consider the following six
indicators of crime to be of particular importance: urbanisation, family disruption,
the influence of peer groups, poverty and unemployment, deterrence and wealth.
Arguments behind the relevance of “urbanisation”, “family disruption” and “peer
groups” mainly originate from sociologically oriented contributions to the
scientific literature (for instance, from theories of social disorganisation,
differential association/ social learning and social control), whereas “poverty and
unemployment”, “deterrence” and “wealth” play a more prominent role in the
economic theory of crime. Sharp distinctions, however, are difficult to make.
Poverty and unemployment, for instance, are also crucial to the understanding of
social disorganisation theory as well as of strain theory, whereas the
contributions of peer groups and of neighbourhood effects belong to the most
discussed fields in modern economics.
The influence of peer groups is widely acknowledged but hardly measurable in
any macro setting that has to be based on official data. Deterrence, at least in the
form of changing clear-up rates, seems to be effective according to many (but
not all) authors, though the deterrence effect of more severe sentences is still
under debate. The authors have contributed to this field in a recent article (Entorf
and Spengler 2000b), but unfortunately there were no European data of sufficient
quality and comparability available that could have been used in the present
study. The impact and measurement of family disruption, wealth, unemployment
and urbanisation is included in our empirical investigations discussed below.
The literature is relatively silent about the consequences of criminality on
economic performance, social cohesion - as well as on the costs of crime. Given
its obvious importance to economists, there is surprisingly little evidence on how
location decisions of firms and households might be affected by criminal factors.
Recent work on 629 neighbourhoods (municipalities) in Los Angeles (Willis
1999), however, provides a remarkable exception. Willis has shown, for instance,
that a one per cent increase of violent crime is responsible for the loss of 14 jobs
per square mile. Two of these 14 jobs are lost, in the relatively attractive
                                                
2 In the project description (European Commission 1998) it is emphasised that empirical research
has to be carried out using data from official statistics.
5manufacturing sector and nine are lost in services and other employment. One
job is lost in wholesale trade and public utilities respectively. The employment in
retail trade and in construction seems to be insensitive to crime.
There are more studies investigating the impact of crime on social cohesion – in
particular on crime-induced population flight. A very recent and accurate study
of that kind is Cullen and Levitt (1999). Using data of 137 U.S. cities to analyse
the relationship between crime and “urban flight”, Cullen and Levitt find that each
additional reported crime in a central city is associated with a net decline of about
one resident. The economic consequence is reinforced by the drain of high
income households: These households are five times more responsive than those
of the poor, and the households with children are twice as responsive as those
without children. Other studies investigating the impact of crime on population
flight find similar results.
Estimates of the costs of crime are difficult to make. Costs of crime do not only
include property losses, medical costs and pay losses due to injury. They also
include costs of public and private efforts made to prevent and reduce future
crime rates, as well as costs of the criminal justice system. Moreover, there are
intangible costs such as those resulting from shattered lives and from a lack of
full participation in life because of fear of crime. Nevertheless, estimates of the
costs of crime, even if they represent approximate values, are indispensable for
an efficient use of public policy. Estimations have been provided mainly for non-
European countries (only few exceptions can be found for Europe, see, for
instance, Palle and Godefroy (1998)). Many authors present figures for total
costs of crime that amount to something like 4-6 per cent of GDP. The highest
estimate is given for the U.S. by Anderson (1999), who has tried to make a
comparison with the ideal state in which there is no occurrence of criminal
behaviour at all. His cost estimate then would even amount to 13 per cent.
6Table 1: Summary of crime related indicators proposed in the literature
Variable
(1)
I®C
(2)
C®I
(3)
Indicator proposed in the literature
(4)
Variable type
(5)
Relevant sections
in E&S
(6)
Wealth (absolute) +/- - Median family income,
Gross domestic product per capita etc.
Economic 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.9
Poverty + + Percentage of population below the poverty line
Percentage of families below half of median family income
Share of social welfare recipients in the population
Infant mortality rate
Percentage of individuals aged 25 with less than five years of
education
Percentage of individuals below 18 years of age living with one
parent
Unemployment
Female headed households etc.
Economic 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.10
Inequality + + Gini coefficient
Ratio of the percentage of total income received by the top 20 per
cent of families to the percentage received by the lowest 20 per
cent of families
Share of income received by the top 20 per cent etc.
Economic 2.1.2, 2.1.3,
2.1.10, 2.1.11
Social Security - ? Sum of all welfare payments divided by state population
Number of recipients of all welfare programs divided by state
population
Sum of all welfare payments divided by state population etc.
Economic 2.1.3, 2.1.12
Wages (in general) +/- -/+ Mean wage in the population etc. Labour market 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.11
Youth wages - -/+ Mean youth wage etc. Labour market 2.1.3, 2.1.11
Minimum wages - ? Mean wage for low skilled workers etc. Labour market 2.1.3, 2.1.11
Job quality - - Wages
Working hours per day etc.
Labour market 2.1.3, 2.1.11
Unemployment rate +/- ? Labour market 2.1.3, 2.1.11
Educational attainment - - Share of the college educated in the population
Share of illiterate individuals in population
Labour market 2.1.1, 2.1.15
7Share of school dropouts in the population etc.
Occupational status of residents - - Share of individuals in professional and managerial positions etc. Labour market 2.1.1, 2.1.15
Female labour force participation +/- ? Percentage of the female civilian labour force Labour market 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.5,
2.1.11
Clear-up rate - -/+ Proportion of crimes cleared by the police Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.19
Conviction rate - -/+ Proportion of those arrested who either plead guilty or are convicted Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.19
Imprisonment rate - ? Proportion of the guilty persons who are imprisoned Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.19
Recognisance rate - ? Proportion of the guilty persons who are placed on recognisance Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.19
Fine rate - ? Proportion of the guilty persons who are fined Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.19
Average sentence - ? Average length of the court imprisonment sentence for those
imprisoned
Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.19
Private crime prevention - + Turnover of private security firms per capita
Employees of private security sector per x inhabitants
Deterrence 2.1.3, 2.1.20
Mobility of residents + + Influx
Move
Percentage of residents brought up in the area where they currently
live
Percentage of households that have been in the area for less than
three years etc.
Demographic/
Social cohesion
2.1.1, 2.1.16
Ethnicity + + Share of foreigners in the population
Probability that two randomly selected individuals of an area would
be members of different ethnic groups
Nationality dummies etc.
Demographic/
Social cohesion
2.1.1, 2.1.17
Family disruption + + Proportion of divorced and separated adults among those who have
ever married
Percentage of households with single parents with children
Number of children etc.
Demographic/
Social cohesion
2.1.1, 2.1.5, 2.1.13
Household size/ crowding +/- ? Mean household size
Persons per room etc.
Demographic/
Social cohesion
2.1.1, 2.1.2
Urbanity + - Population per square kilometre
Share of population living in big cities
Share of multiplex dwellings in all dwellings etc.
Demographic/
Social cohesion
2.1.1, 2.1.18
Friendship network (not delinquent) - ? Number of friends who reside in the local community Social cohesion 2.1.1, 2.1.5
Organisational participation -/+ - Percentage of residents who participated in meetings of
committees and clubs
Number of committees and clubs per x inhabitants
Social cohesion 2.1.1, 2.1.2
8Institutional control - - Percentage of population that attends high school or college
Percentage of population in the civilian labour force
Number of families per city population etc.
Social cohesion 2.1.1, 2.1.5
Religiosity - - Share of members of a church in the population etc. Social cohesion 2.1.22
Public transportation + - Per cent of the employees who use public transportation
Expenditure on public transportation
Presence of subways etc.
Infrastructure 2.1.2
Public leisure activities + - Average sales of eating and drinking establishments per resident
Concentration of Taverns and Lounges
Supply (absolute or relative) of sports and entertainment
establishments
Number of sports clubs etc.
Infrastructure 2.1.2
Weather (the better, the more crime) + Average temperature (on a monthly or quarterly basis)
Total rainfall (on a monthly or quarterly basis)
Total sunshine (on a monthly or quarterly basis etc.)
Environment 2.1.2, 2.1.23
Number of dark hours during a day + Environment 2.1.2, 2.1.23
Media consumption +/- ? Populations’ mean TV viewing intensity etc. Techno-economic 2.1.2, 2.1.21
Age - Demographic/
control
2.1.17
Gender (male) + Share of males in the population
Male/ Female dummies
Demographic/
control
2.1.17
Young male population + Share of the young aged 15-25 in the population Demographic/
control
2.1.17
Source: Own representation.
93 Data and methods
The evaluation of indicators of crime and the test of causal relationships is based on
statistical methods suitable for the analysis of dynamic panel data (“panel
criminometrics”). Given the complex problem of criminality, the technical estimation
and testing procedure is chosen in a way that multidimensional phenomena can be
treated, and dynamic developments and feedback situations can be taken into
consideration. Moreover, it is very important in the context of analysing crime rates
to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity. It arises in the presence of different
shares of unreported crimes or because of deviating definitions of crime between
regions. For this reason all estimates presented in E&S are based on fixed-effect
panel models which have undergone an extensive validation process based on
statistical specification tests and checks of robustness.
Collecting data was a major problem while carrying out the project. On the one hand,
it is aspired to perform the empirical analysis for as many EU member states as
possible. On the other hand, data should be as disaggregate as possible. However, at
least regional data on crime are not available from international data sources. As a
consequence, the regional crime data had to be collected directly from the member
states. In Germany the situation was even more complicated, because the Criminal
Police Offices of all 16 German states (“Landeskriminalämter”) had to be contacted.
Table 2 (Table 15 in E&S) provides information on the data at our disposal, general
information on regional crime data in Europe, as well as some remarks on their
availability. In contrast to regional data, national data are available from international
sources, but they sometimes lack reliability (see Interpol and UN statistics, for
instance).
When inspecting the regional data in more detail, it turned out that data from
Denmark, Germany and Italy are without obvious shortcomings.3 They are all
observed on the NUTS 3 level; the respective number of regions is high (Germany
and Italy), and/or the average population size and land area of the regions is rather
low. Results from other countries should be interpreted with some care (see Section
4.3 in E&S for details).
National crime data have been taken from the European Committee on Crime
Problems (CDPC). Solely CDPC (1999:9) has proved to be aware of the absolute
necessity of a thorough check on the data delivered by national sources.
Since the aim of the project is to identify and quantify causes and consequences of
criminality, we have also included a large set of socio-economic variables. The New
Cronos database from Eurostat turned out to be very useful. It does not only contain
                                                
3 This may also apply to the Greek crime data. Unfortunately, this data could not be used in the project
since it arrived after the submission of the Final Report.
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very detailed national statistics for all EU member states, but also a number of
important variables on different regional levels. As far as statistics on the national
level are concerned, we also used data from the World Bank.
Table 2: Availability of regional crime data from the EU member states
Country Does the
country
collect
regional
crime
data?
Did the
country
deliver
regional
crime data
on
request?
Available
period
Could
provided
data be
used in the
analyses?
Remarks concerning the non-
availability of data
Belgium Yes Yes 1994-1998 No
Denmark Yes Yes 1982-1998 Yes
Germany Yes Yes Irregular* Yes
Greece Yes Yes 1991-1998 No
Spain Yes Yes 1980-1998 Yes
France Yes No --- --- First NUTS 3 level data was
promised and also announced; this
data did never arrive; after several
inquiries NUTS 3 level data was
refused, and NUTS 2 level data was
promised instead; until today no
data has arrived.
Ireland No --- --- --- Until today Ireland has not collected
regional crime data; regional data
will be available after finishing the
present change of the statistical
system.
Italy Yes Yes 1983-1998 Yes
The Netherlands Yes Yes 1983-1998 Yes
Austria Yes No --- --- NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 level data was
refused and NUTS 1 level data was
promised; no data has arrived until
today.
Portugal Yes Yes 1984-1998 No
Finland Yes Yes 1980-1998 Yes
Sweden Yes Yes 1988-1998 Yes
UK Yes Yes 1982-1997 Partly
Note: * Baden-Württemberg (1984-1998), Bavaria (1983-1998), Berlin (1980-1998), Brandenburg (1995-1998),
Bremen (1980-1998), Hamburg (1989-1998), Hessen (1984-1998), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1993-1998),
Northrhine-Westfalia (1980/81-1998), Lower Saxony (1980-1998), Rhineland-Palatinate (1994-1998), Saarland
(1980-1998), Saxony-Anhalt (1997-1998), Schleswig-Holstein (1980-1998), Thuringia (1993-1998).
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4 Evaluation of the causes of crime based on national data
Table 3 (Table 25 in E&S) provides a summary of “Crime in the Europe of Nations”,
i.e. of results based on a cross-section of national time series from the 15 EU
member states. We summarise Tables 18 to 24 of E&S with respect to relevant
indicators of crime, direction and magnitude of influence. For each relevant indicator
we present all affected categories of crime. The magnitude of the effect is presented
as elasticity, i.e. increasing the indicator by one per cent would translate into a change
of crime by the amount listed in the table. For instance, increasing unemployment by
one per cent would increase burglary by 0.4 per cent.4
The consistency of results presented in Table 3 allows us to draw some general
conclusions. First, wealth (GDP p.c.) varies positively with crime against property
and negatively with intentional homicides. Drug abuse very likely is a problem of
wealthy societies. Unemployment, long-term unemployment and, in particular, youth
unemployment increase the number of property crimes as well as the crime rate of
assaults. Juvenile delinquency also seems to be the main driving force behind the
positive variation of the share of young foreigners with the theft of motor vehicles,
burglary and intentional homicide.5
Higher participation rates lead to higher crime rates. This result simply reflects the
fact that more active people magnify the pool of potential criminals.6 The crime
enhancing effect of the female labour force participation is somewhat more difficult
                                                
4 One has to focus one’s attention on the fact that increasing unemployment by one per cent is different
from increasing the unemployment rate by one percentage point. A rise of unemployment by one
percentage point from, e.g., 2% to 3%, would result in an increase of unemployment by 50%. The
same note of caution applies to all variables expressed as ratios, i.e. unemployment, labour force
participation, workers with fixed term contracts, part-time working, foreigners and divorces.
5 In our econometric specifications the foreigner variable needs to be present in order to avoid the
omitted-variable bias. Moreover, the effect of young foreigners is in accordance with results known
from the social disorganisation theory (see Section 2.1.1 in E&S). Nevertheless, the underlying reason
for this result should be interpreted with care. There are many reasons why foreigners are over-
represented in the group of suspects. First, they may be more often wrongly suspected than the native
population. Second, there are some laws - like the foreigner and asylum laws - which can, by
definition, only be broken by foreigners. Third, foreigners who reside in Europe are to a higher
percentage young men. Fourth, some foreigners may be in European countries after fleeing their
homeland, because they were offenders there. Finally, most foreigners enter European countries,
because they had no economic success in their home country. The latter may be due to factors that
foster crime, for example, lack of education. These points should be kept in mind when judging the
coefficients of the foreigner variable in our estimations.
6 For males the elasticity of the participation rate ranges between 2.1 and 2.3 with respect to total theft
(see Tables 18 to 25 in E&S). This result is not included in Table 3 because it does not clearly confirm
to be significant for other crime categories, and because Table 3 is restricted to both significant and
robust results.
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to interpret. On the one hand, the argument might be the same as for males, i.e. data
on participation rates reflect nothing but the part of the population that most likely is
involved in criminal activities. Since, however, only a small part of all criminals are
women, the interpretation has to be different from that of males. The positive sign
might indicate that a higher active share of women in the population also provides a
larger pool of potential victims.
Table 3: Crime in the Europe of Nations: Indicators and their effects
Indicator Range of (mean) elasticities Endogenous crime categories
Real GDP p.c. 0.6 – 0.9 Theft of motor vehicles
0.7 – 1.0 Robbery
 0.6 Assault
-1.8 Intentional homicide
1.1 Drug offences
Unemployment 0.4 Burglary
0.01* Robbery
Youth unemployment 0.3 Total theft
0.1* – 0.2* Theft of motor vehicles
0.1* Robbery
0.2* Assault
0.5 Drug offences
Long-term unemployment 0.2 Total theft
0.3 Robbery
Female labour force participation, 15-64 0.7 – 1.1 Burglary
1.3 Robbery
Male workers with fixed-term contracts -0.6 – -0.5 Total theft
-0.2 Burglary
-0.3 Robbery
Male workers working part-time 0.6 Robbery
0.8 Drug offences
Young foreigners, 15-24 0.3 Theft of motor vehicles
0.2 Burglary
0.2 – 0.3 Intentional homicide
Age of males at time of first marriage 2.6 Theft of motor vehicles
2.0 Assault
3.4 Intentional homicide
Divorces per 100 marriages 0.4 – 0.5 Total theft
0.2 – 0.3 Burglary
0.2 Assault
0.4 – 0.6 Intentional homicide
0.9 Drug offences
Notes: Summary of panel estimates presented in Tables 18 to 24 in E&S. Entries are based on coefficient
estimates that are significant at least at the 5%-level. Furthermore, indicators are only included if they are
relevant for at least two different types of crime. Preliminary results (e.g. results based on estimations without
fixed-effects) are omitted. Semi-elasticities are transformed to elasticities on the basis of respective sample
averages. *) indicates elasticities based on quadratic impact curves evaluated at the sample mean of the
indicator variable.
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On the other hand, however, there are arguments pointing out that the merits of
increasing female labour force participation might come along with the unpleasant
cost of higher crime rates. Recently, a number of authors have focused their attention
on this important and often overlooked aspect of crime (Donohue and Siegelman
1998, Greenwood 1998, Wilson 1998 and Witt and Witte 1998). According to them,
the influx of women into the labour market (without a simultaneous fall of the male
participation rate) bears the danger of declining family values associated with
changing social norms, ineffective childhood socialisation, lowering social
attachments and deteriorating parental supervision.7
Other - more direct - indicators of family disruption confirm the crucial role of causal
crime factors embedded in family values. Table 3 shows significant results for “age
of males at time of first marriage” and, in particular, for “divorces per marriage”. All
estimates show unanimous signs, indicating that intensified family values would lower
crime rates. Here “more family” more specifically means taking responsibility at
younger age (as regards marriage and childbirth), as well as sticking by the bonds of
marriage. Coefficients on these variables reveal substantial quantitative effects.
Finally, male fixed-term contracts and male part-time working have opposite effects.
It seems that the provision with full-time jobs is crime preventing, even if the duration
is limited by fixed-term contracts, whereas part-time jobs leave enough free time and
“better” possibilities for illegal work and worse possibilities for legal work.
5 Investigating the causes of crime by use of regional data
Regional data have the advantage that they are closer to the scene of the crime. Our
regional data base consists of approximately 550 European regional time series from
8 different countries. The problem, however, is that for data of such high spatial
detail there are only few variables left in our international data source that could be
used as explanatory factors of crime.8 In particular, variables on family disruption,
which played a prominent role for the explanation of crime in the “Europe of
Nations”, are almost missing. We were only able to include the gross birth rate, but
                                                
7 Of course, some of the disagreeable effects of the increasing female labour force participation rate
discussed in our Report might perhaps be offset by a simultaneous fall of the male participation rate.
However, such cases escape from our analysis as they are not visible in aggregate data sets. Since our
empirical work has to follow a positive research strategy, we can only deal with and comment on
matters of statistical evidence.
8 At the beginning of the project we intended to complete the Eurostat variables with data from national
sources in order to obtain as much of the indicators from Table 1 as possible. However, some
requests directed to national statistical offices quickly revealed that this strategy was not compatible
with the budget and running time constraints of the project. Thus, our empirical investigations in
exclusively rely on data from the Eurostat New Cronos Regio database.
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most coefficient estimates on this indicator turned out to be rather unsatisfactory,
with the exception of fraud.
On the other hand, results are based on a high number of observations, thus
statistical uncertainty can be reduced substantially. Panel estimates, each of which
was optimised with respect to the lag structure of explanatory variables after
checking 2187 possible permutations (see Section 4.3.1, and Tables 34 to 45 in
E&S), show that real GDP per capita can be identified as a robust European
indicator for serious assault (+)9, robbery and violent theft (+), theft of motor cars
(+) and drug offences (+). The unemployment rate is a European indicator for
serious assault (+), total theft (-), theft of motor cars (-) and drug offences (+). The
activity rate (work force participation rate) is a European indicator for breaking and
entering (+) and drug offences (+). The gross birth rate is a European indicator for
fraud (-). The share of employment in the agricultural sector is a European indicator
for sex offences (-) and serious assault (-). Finally, the number of drug offences per
100,000 inhabitants is a European indicator for robbery and violent theft (+), breaking
and entering (+) and fraud (+). One might conclude that these results are largely in
accordance with our expectations.
6 Summary of national and regional evidence
As a synthesis of our investigations performed on both national and regional data
sets, Table 4 (Table 49 in E&S) presents a summary of the most robust empirical
findings with respect to the evaluation of causal indicators of crime. Besides
demographic factors like age and gender, the main socio-economic causes of
criminality are covered by indicators of family disruption, drug influence, the activity
rate of the population (i.e. the labour force participation rate) and urbanity (measured
indirectly by the share of the labour force employed in the agrarian sector).
First, the total labour force participation rate is most likely associated with higher
crime rates, simply because it represents the “active” part of the population. The
potential of being “active” implies to work in a regular job or to search for such a
job, but it likewise increases the probability of being “active” in the illegal sector.
Moreover, since active people have to be mobile and do not stay at home, they more
often are victims of criminal activities, too. Such reasoning holds a fortiori for the
most “active” part of the population, i.e. the share of the young.
The share of the population working in the agrarian sector represents the inverted
degree of urbanity in a society. The crime enhancing influence of urban factors is
particularly strong for assault and drug offences.
                                                
9 “+” indicates that higher values of the indicator foster crime, “-“ indicates that higher values of the
indicator reduce crime.
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Many estimations based on the “Europe of Nations” confirm the crucial role of
causal crime factors embedded in family disruption for almost all types of crime.
Significant results have been found for “divorces per marriage” and other indicators
of family disruption. These results are in line with theories stressing the lowering
parental supervision of youth, the declining value of conventional norms and the
decreasing social capital within industrialised countries, since more and more people
act in own short-term self-interest.
Table 4: Main socio-economic causes of crime and their directions of influence
General Murder Serious
Assault
Total Theft Robbery and
violent theft
Theft of
motor cars
Drug offences
Family
disruption
(+)
Drugs
(+)
Activity rate
(+)
Urbanity
(+)
Family
disruption
(+)
Wealth
(+)
Unemploy-
ment
(+)
Family
disruption
(+)
Urbanity
(+)
Wealth
(+)
Family
disruption
(+)
Drugs
(+)
Wealth
(+)
Drugs
(+)
Wealth
(+)
Share of the
young
(+)
Wealth
(+)
Family
disruption
(+)
Unemploy-
ment
(+)
Activity rate
(+)
Urbanity
(+)
Note: Summary of the most robust findings based on estimations in the Report.
Many offences are related to drugs. This conclusion becomes clear from the analysis
of theft, in particular from the analysis of “robbery and violent theft”. The
explanatory factors of drug offences themselves are “wealth (+)”, “family disruption
(+)”, “unemployment (+) ”, “labour force participation (+)” and “urbanity (+)”.
Hence, drug problems most probably arise in the urban climate of cities, which is
accompanied by social problems due to (structural) unemployment and disruption of
family cohesion.
The incidence of theft and related categories of crime (robbery and violent theft, theft
of motor cars) can be best understood by consulting the economic theory of crime.
Better illegal income opportunities lead to higher property crime rates, as can be seen
from the presence of “wealth (+)” for the respective types of crime. It should be
noted, however, that wealth does not exist in a one-to-one relation to real GDP per
capita, because wealth might also mean absence of unemployment. To a certain
extent, this is a problem of regional data sets. One can see from our disaggregate
data set of the “Europe of regions” (see above) that, in areas where both low
unemployment and high GDP coexist, higher crime rates for theft, in particular for
theft of motor cars, can be observed, because these regions provide lucrative
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targets.10 Thus, in the cases of “total theft” and “theft of motor cars” (see Table 4),
we interpret high “wealth” as being associated with regions of high GDP and low
unemployment.
This pattern of GDP and unemployment does not coincide with the pattern of drug
offences and serious assault, where the simultaneous existence of high GDP and
(given the high level of GDP) relatively high unemployment seems to provide the
unfavourable and unbalanced social situation that leads to high levels of crime. Our
results reflect the widely discussed and unsolved problem in the scientific literature of
how to interpret the effect of unemployment on crime. We suggest to have a closer
look at the type of crime, in particular when using regional crime data.
Due to data restrictions, there was no possibility to include measures of inequality,
which are not available from international sources at the regional level and on a yearly
basis over a long period of time. To a certain degree, i.e. depending on size and
direction of the correlation, results on “wealth” might be influenced by this missing
variable. However, in a recent publication (Entorf and Spengler 2000b) the
simultaneous use of wealth and an indicator of inequality does neither change the sign
of the absolute wealth variable nor does it render its coefficient insignificant.
7 Consequences of crime
One of the most innovative contributions of the project is the assessment of the
negative impact of crime on economic performance based on an international cross-
section of nations, a panel consisting of national time series from the 15 EU member
states, and a set of regional panel data originating from 8 different countries. Our
great investment in searching adequate regional data has brought substantial returns.
It turned out that data of a higher spatial detail in fact entail a higher statistical power
for the discovery of reversal crime effects. In contrast with previous attempts known
from the scientific literature, and in contrast with testing procedures carried out on
aggregate data (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 in E&S), causality tests based on the
NUTS 2 level and, in particular, on the NUTS 3 level have shown that growth rates
are indeed negatively affected by the regional incidence of crime.
Table 5 (Table 50 in E&S) summarises the main findings. First of all, the incidence of
theft and related crime categories (theft of motor cars, aggravated theft, robbery and
violent theft) vary negatively with growth of real GDP per capita and with growth of
employment. Crime against the person, too, deters growth, but to a lesser extent.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that the potential dangers of “serious assault” and
“rape” in the neighbourhood of workplaces do hamper economic performance.
                                                
10 Which does not necessarily mean that offenders live in that particular region. Crimes, however, are
recorded in the region where they are committed.
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Table 5: Criminality indicators of economic performance
Criminality Indicator Affected Countries
In parentheses: measures of economic performance: Y = GDP growth, L =
employment growth
Serious assault Germany (Y)
Rape Denmark (L)
Theft (total) Denmark (L, Y), Germany (L, Y), Italy (Y), Sweden (L)
Aggravated theft Germany (L, Y), Italy (Y)
Robbery and violent theft Denmark (Y), Germany (L, Y), Italy (Y)
Theft of motor cars Germany (L,Y), Italy (Y), Europe (investment/GDP ratio)
Fraud Germany (Y (positive sign ?))
Drug Offences Italy (L, Y), Finland (L, Y (positive sign?) )
Note: Summary of most significant and robust results from Tables 27 to 32, Tables 47 and 48 in E&S. Entries
are based on data from the NUTS 3 level (if not available: NUTS 2). In order to be included signs have to be
unambiguous and t-values need to show significance at least at the one per cent level. All but two effects are
negative, (unreasonable) exceptions are provided with “?”.
Denmark, Germany and Italy can be identified as most affected countries, mostly by
property crimes. However, as has become very clear from the comparison of highly
aggregate and disaggregate data, the link from crime to economic performance is
very difficult to unveil using aggregate data. Hence, countries not mentioned in the list
above may nevertheless suffer from crime distortions, but so far they may have
escaped detection because of insufficient data quality.
8 Policy conclusions
Though drawing policy conclusions does not belong to the primary goals of the
project, some remarks are straightforward. It seems that in European (and other
industrialised) societies a further growth of wealth comes with the cost of family
disruption, as, for instance, can be concluded, from the growing number of divorces
throughout Europe. Changing family structures, however, are an important and often
overlooked cause of crime. According to a number of recent contributions to the
scientific literature, the female labour force participation is an important factor of
family disruption, and it is found to vary positively with crime rates (in this project,
too, we have found a positive association with burglary and robbery). The main
reasons for these empirical findings might be seen in the lacking supervision and the
degrading social attachment of children and in the rising negative influence of peer
groups, which substitute for traditional family bonds. However, before final
conclusions on these hypotheses can be drawn, more empirical evidence based on
individual data would be needed.
Since the message learned from our results cannot be to reduce the female
participation rate, other measures of family (re-)integration have to be taken, and
substitutes of parental supervision seem to be relevant to prevent crime. Many pupils
of working mothers and fathers have to take care of themselves after school, since
teachers do not have enough time at their disposal to supervise homework, for
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instance. The need for after school care centres is even much stronger for children in
female headed households.
Regarding the importance of social cohesion on criminality and the strong evidence
of reversal effects of crime on economics, one may conclude that fighting crime
should not only be a matter of domestic policy, but also of social policy and of
selfish economic interests, i.e. of economic policy.
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